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Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act: The Evolution of Whistleblower Protections,
Employment Contracts and Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements
Florence Shu-Acquaye*
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 21, 2010, in response to the financial abuses that occurred
during from 2007 to 2009, President Barack Obama signed into law
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank Act”).
This Act was, for the most part, created to increase protection for
whistleblower employees who report alleged fraudulent corporate be-
havior against employee retaliation.  Thus, under Dodd Frank, em-
ployees who report violations of law are protected from employer
retaliation that may result from reporting such violations.  One of the
primary intended consequences of Dodd-Frank was to restore public
faith and confidence in the financial system.1  Dodd-Frank is also in-
tended to play a pivotal role in preempting and exposing attempted
fraud.2
The Dodd-Frank Act is claimed to be an improvement on the
whistleblower protection provided under the Sarbanes Oxley Act of
2002 (SOX).3  Prior to SOX, there were laws in place to protect gov-
ernment employees who reported fraud to avoid the waste of taxpayer
money, but such employee protections did not extend to private sector
employees.  Under SOX protection was extended, but not all private
sector employees were covered; protection was limited to employees
of a company that either registered a class of securities per § 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or were required to file reports under
* Florence Shu-Acquaye is a Professor of Law at the Shepard Broad College of Law of Nova
Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, Florida.  She would like to thank Henry Norwood for
his excellent research assistance.
1. See Meghan E. King, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Amendments: The Case
Against the New Amendments to Whistleblower Protection in Section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley, 48
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1457, 1462 (2011).
2. Caroline E. Keen, Clarifying What Is “Clear”: Reconsidering Whistleblower Protections
Under Dodd-Frank, 19 N.C. BANKING INST. 215, 232 (2015).
3. See King, supra note 1, at 1460.
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§ 15(d) of the Act.4  The source of protection for a private company’s
employees was contained in § 806 of SOX.5  However, §§ 922 and
929A of Dodd-Frank extended protection for whistleblower employ-
ees not covered under SOX.6  Dodd-Frank also simplifies the proce-
dures for whistleblower employees.  Under SOX, the whistleblower
has to first file a claim to the Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (“OSHA”);7 if after 180 days there is no final determination,
then the whistleblower could bring an action in a federal district
court.8  However, under Dodd-Frank, the complainant has direct ac-
cess to the district court to file a claim.9
This Article examines the historical impetus behind the Dodd-
Frank Act against the backdrop of the Wall Street financial crisis.  I
will look at SOX in light of changes made by Congress under the
Dodd-Frank Act as it relates to improving some provisions of SOX, as
well as examining case law to see if there is indeed a commensurate
improvement as intended by Congress.  This Article will analyze the
SOX and Dodd-Frank Acts to highlight any fundamental differences
that could change the outcome of a case depending upon which Act a
whistleblower decides to bring a claim under.  For example, under
SOX, a whistleblower may be qualified in receiving back pay after a
retaliatory discharge, whereas under Dodd-Frank that same
whistleblower is eligible for double the back pay.10  In the same vein,
Dodd-Frank created a bounty program that would monetarily reward
whistleblowers who report directly to the SEC if the reported infor-
mation results in successful enforcement, thereby giving
whistleblowers an even stronger incentive to report under Dodd-
Frank.11  However, the question of who exactly is considered a
whistleblower under Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation protection is still
unsettled, given that the courts have recently rendered differing deci-
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1415A(a) (2012); see also King, supra note 1,
at 1458.
5. Id. § 806.
6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 922, 929A, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78u-6(h), 1514A (2012).
7. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806; 29 C.F.R. § 1980.103(d) (2016).
8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806(b)(1)(B).
9. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i).
10. See Keen, supra note 2, at 218-19.
11. Id. at 218. However, the SEC’s regulations have widened eligibility of the bounty program
to include a whistleblower that reports internally; the company thereafter passes the information
to the SEC. Id. at 229. The bounty program basically encourages corporate employees who are
“aware of legal violations to become statutorily defined as ‘whistleblowers’ by reporting viola-
tions to the SEC in order to qualify for the monetary awards.” Nicole Sprinzen, Asadi v GE
Energy (USA) L.L.C.: A Case Study of the Limits of Dodd-Frank Anti-Retaliation Protections
and the Impact on Corporate Compliance Objectives, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 151, 153 (2014).
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sions on the issue of whether a whistleblower must report any viola-
tions to the SEC, or if internal reporting would be sufficient to claim
the benefit.  I will therefore examine court decisions in this area to
determine whether there is a trend toward one decision over the
other, and if there is potential for reconciliation of the conflict.
Furthermore, this Article will take a look at how the Dodd-Frank
whistleblower protections may impact companies and countries
outside of the United States.  In the case of Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens
AG,12 the Second Circuit held that Dodd-Frank does not apply
outside the United States, and therefore the plaintiff, a citizen of Tai-
wan working for a Chinese company that had shares listed on the New
York Stock Exchange, was not eligible for protection under Dodd-
Frank.13  However, a U.S. parent company with a foreign subsidiary
company may nonetheless wish to avoid or discourage fraud through
the use of codes of conduct or codes of ethics, for example, and en-
courage its foreign employees to report possible corporate violations,
even though the subsidiary may not be directly subject to Dodd-
Frank.  Can this be done without running afoul of the privacy laws of
other countries or even their cultural norms?14
Finally, this Article will analyze the impact of amending SOX under
Dodd-Frank to prohibit mandatory arbitration agreements between
employees and employers.  This tends to undermine the universal
principle of freedom of contract, as well as an individual’s ability to
seek alternative dispute resolution methods.  Arbitration could be
cheaper and more expedient to an employee who is unlikely to have
as many resources as the employer.  Would it have been better for
Congress to remain neutral on this issue and thereby let the parties
have the unfettered right to contract as desired?  Is the mandatory
arbitration prohibition under Dodd-Frank really advantageous to the
whistleblower?
II. FROM SOX TO DODD-FRANK: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
In October 2001, one of the fastest-growing companies in the
United States, Enron, revealed that it had drastically misstated its in-
12. 763 F.3d 175, 177 (2d Cir. 2014).
13. Id. at 183.
14. See Stephen M. Kohn, Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Legal Protection for Corporate Whistleblowers,
NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR., http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php?option=com_content&
task=view&id=27 (last visited Jan. 30, 2016) (stating that there could be repercussions of shame
for an individual who is identified with a group to have reported that a member of the group did
not act properly).
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come for years.15  Prior to the scandal, Enron was considered one of
the best-managed, most successful companies in the United States.16
The company collapsed four months after the revelation and declared
bankruptcy.17  The scandal resulted in losses of billions for investors
and employees, as well as thousands of jobs.18  Several Enron execu-
tives were arrested as a result and several other companies were ex-
posed as committing accounting fraud over the next year.19  These
scandals pressed Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.20
SOX was passed in order to “provide for criminal prosecution and
enhanced penalties of persons who defraud investors in publicly
traded securities or alter or destroy evidence in certain Federal inves-
tigations . . . [and] to protect whistleblowers who report fraud against
retaliation by their employers, and for other purposes.”21
One motivation behind the enactment of SOX was “[t]o protect in-
vestors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclo-
sures made pursuant to the securities laws.”22  “Prior to Sarbanes-
Oxley, there was no federal protection for whistleblowing employees
of publicly traded companies.”23  Significant protections were already
in place for federal employees for the purpose of preventing waste of
taxpayer dollars.24
B. The Dodd-Frank Act
In the year 2000, Harry Markopolos25 attempted to expose possibly
the largest Ponzi scheme in history.26  Employed by a separate securi-
15. Connor C. Turpan, Whistleblower? More Like Cybercriminal: The Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act as Applied to Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers, 42 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
120, 123-24 (2016); King, supra note 1, at 1459; Jason Zuckerman, Recent Developments in
Whistleblower Law from a Whistleblower Lawyer’s Perspective, SX001 ALI-CLE 851 (2015);
William Dorsey, Materiality in Sarbanes-Oxley Act Employee Protection Claims, 27 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 339, 340-41 (2007).
16. Turpan, supra note 15, at 123-24.
17. Id.; King, supra note 1, at 1459.
18. Turpan, supra note 15, at 124.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 124-25; King, supra note 1, at 1459-60.
21. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2 (2002).
22. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15, 18, 28 U.S.C. (2012)).
23. Turpan, supra note 15, at 126; King, supra note 1, at 1458.
24. King, supra note 1, at 1458.
25. Harry Markopolos was an American securities fund manager who, beginning in the year
2000, would repeatedly attempt to blow the whistle on one of the largest Ponzi schemes in
United States history being run by Bernie Madoff. Andrew Clark, The Man Who Blew the Whis-
tle on Bernard Madoff, GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2010, 8:17 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/busi-
ness/2010/mar/24/bernard-madoff-whistleblower-harry-markopolos.
26. King, supra note 1, at 1462-63.
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ties firm,27 Markopolos investigated the securities firm run by Bernie
Madoff,28 attempting to understand how Madoff achieved such suc-
cessful returns on investments.29  Markopolos instead discovered a
massive fraudulent scheme and reported Madoff to the SEC in 2000.30
The SEC did not act on Markopolos’s report.31  Markopolos tried
again in 2001, 2005, 2007, and 2008.32  Each time Markopolos reported
Madoff to the SEC he was ignored.33  It was only because Madoff
confessed his crimes to his sons, who subsequently turned Madoff
over to the police that Madoff’s scheme finally came to an end in
2008.34  Markopolos would later condemn the SEC to Congress for
the agency’s failure to act earlier and prevent Madoff from squander-
ing as much as he had.35  Due in part to the Bernie Madoff Ponzi
scheme, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act on July 21, 2010.36
The stated purpose of Dodd-Frank is to “promote the financial sta-
bility of the United States by improving accountability and trans-
parency in the financial system . . . [and] to protect consumers from
abusive financial services practice.”37  Dodd-Frank changed the play-
ing field of securities exchanges through several additional provisions.
Section 922 of Dodd-Frank amends the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to significantly improve the SEC’s whistleblower program, in-
cluding provisions to increase the possible reward to whistleblowers to
between 10% and 30% of collected sanctions which exceed $1,000,000
27. The firm that had hired Harry Markopolos to discover Madoff’s secret to success was
Rampart Investment Management, an investment firm based out of Massachusetts. Clark, supra
note 25.
28. Bernie Madoff was the founder of a U.S. multi-billion-dollar securities investment firm
who orchestrated a fraudulent securities scheme, resulting in the loss of billions of dollars of
investor’s money. Bernard Madoff Biography, BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biography.com/people/
bernard-madoff-466366#arrest (last updated Feb. 1, 2016). Madoff is currently serving a 150-year
sentence in prison. Clark, supra note 25.
29. King, supra note 1, at 1462-63.
30. Id. at 1462.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Melissa C. Nunziato, Aiding and Abetting, a Madoff Family Affair: Why Secondary Actors
Should be Held Accountable for Securities Fraud Through the Restoration of the Private Right of
Action for Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 73 ALB. L. REV. 603,
608 (2010).
35. King, supra note 1, at 1462-63.
36. Id. at 1463; Michael Neal, Securities Whistleblowing Under Dodd-Frank: Neglecting the
Power of “Enterprising Privateers” in Favor of the “Slow-Going Public Vessel”, 15 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1107, 1117-18 (2011).
37. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 7, 12, 15, 26, 28, 31, 42 U.S.C.
(2012)).
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by actions resulting from original information by the whistleblower;
allow the whistleblower to appeal the award determination through
the appropriate court of appeals; provide enhanced anti-retaliation
whistleblower protection, including a private cause of action against
retaliators; and create a whistleblower office to administer and en-
force the provisions of the new SEC whistleblower program.38  Dodd-
Frank required that the SEC promulgate regulations for the new
whistleblower program no later than April 21, 2011.39  On June 13,
2011, the final rules of the SEC whistleblower provisions were
promulgated.40  Two days after President Obama signed the Dodd-
Frank Act into law the SEC awarded its first $1,000,000 bounty award
to Glen and Karen Kaiser for providing the SEC with information
leading to a $17,000,000 sanction against Pequot Capital Manage-
ment.41  A look at cases under Dodd-Frank and other cases pertaining
to whistleblowers will be helpful in understanding the evolution of
case law in the area.
III. EVOLUTION OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT
WHISTLEBLOWER CASE LAW
Courts have struggled with whether whistleblowers under Dodd-
Frank must report their information directly to the SEC or if they may
report internally to their supervisors in order to claim protection by
Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions.  The issue is created by the
language of Dodd-Frank itself.  Dodd-Frank states that a
whistleblower is a person who reports to the SEC; however, the anti-
retaliation provision lists three different types of activities which are
protected from retaliation, the third of which pertains to disclosures
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which has led to the argument that this
third category could be used as an exception to the rule that a
whistleblower under Dodd-Frank must report to the SEC.42  Courts
have come to differing conclusions on this problem.  There is a split
between the Fifth and Second Circuits on this issue.  The Fifth Circuit
has held that only whistleblowers reporting directly to the SEC may
claim protection under Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions.  This
38. King, supra note 1, at 1463.
39. Neal, supra note 36, at 1118.
40. Id.
41. King, supra note 1, at 1463.
42. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 922, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
6(h)(1)(A)(iii). The first activity protected from retaliation is disclosing information directly to
the SEC. Id. § 922, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (h)(1)(A)(i). The second activity protected from retaliation
is the act of testifying or aiding the SEC in bringing an investigation or other proceeding in
furtherance of the Dodd-Frank Act. Id. § 922, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (h)(1)(A)(ii).
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is the minority view of the district courts that have addressed the is-
sue.43  The majority view as espoused by the Second Circuit has since
held that Dodd-Frank protections also extend to whistleblowers re-
porting internally within the company.44  These are the only federal
circuit courts that have addressed the issue, but a number of federal
district courts have also weighed in, as discussed below.
A. Federal District Cases Prior to Asadi
In Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc.,45 the plaintiff-employee of the de-
fendant-CEO discovered that his employer was subverting the com-
pany’s funds into what was essentially a shell corporation owned by
the employer.46  The plaintiff reported this information internally
within the company to the president and board of directors.47  The
CEO-defendant was able to gain control over the board of directors
and fired the plaintiff.48  The plaintiff alleged that the CEO violated
the anti-retaliation provision of Dodd-Frank.49  The defendant argued
that the plaintiff could not bring this claim because he did not directly
report to the SEC.50  The Southern District of New York held that a
plaintiff could bring a Dodd-Frank claim without necessarily reporting
to the SEC.51  The court found that the third Dodd-Frank category is
an exception to the definition of a whistleblower.52  This case, and de-
cision, is significant because it was the first case in which a federal
court dealt with the application of § 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act and
demonstrated that a complaining employee could “establish a prima
facie case” by the use of the anti-retaliatory provision without neces-
sarily reporting the alleged wrongdoing to the SEC.53
In Nollner v. Southern Baptist Convention, Inc.,54 the plaintiff was a
new hire into a New Delhi-based company with a wide range of issues,
including a failure to record invoices, bribing officials, and operating a
43. Stephanie Klein, Interpreting the Definition of a Whistleblower Under Dodd-Frank’s Anti-
Retaliation Provision: How and Why Public Policy Should Guide the Courts in Finding that
Whistleblowers Do not Need to Report to the SEC, 10 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 279, 298 (2014).
44. Id. at 289.
45. No. 10 Civ. 8202 LBS, 2011 WL 1672066 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
46. Id. at *2.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at *3.
50. Id.
51. Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *3.
52. Id.
53. Sprinzen, supra note 11, at 175.
54. 852 F. Supp. 2d 986 (M.D. Tenn. 2012).
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series of shell companies to conceal funds.55  The plaintiff internally
reported these issues within the company, but nothing was done.56
The plaintiff was fired after complaining about these issues.57  The
plaintiff then filed a complaint, seeking protection under Dodd-
Frank.58  While the case was disposed of on other grounds, the court
did look at whether the third category of the anti-retaliation provision
requires reporting directly to the SEC.59  The court determined that
the third category does not mandate a whistleblower report directly to
the SEC.60  The court further held that in order for a plaintiff to take
advantage of this third category, a plaintiff must show that his report-
ing somehow relates to a violation of a federal securities law.61
Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp.62 involved a plaintiff-employee working
for a defendant-company.63  When the plaintiff believed that the de-
fendant’s CFO, by being a member of a pension plan committee of
which the CFO was the sole beneficiary, was involved in a conflict of
interest, the plaintiff reported his concerns within the company.64  The
CFO told the plaintiff not to contact the SEC.65  Instead, the plaintiff
reported his concerns to the company’s board of directors and was
terminated shortly afterward.66  The court agreed with Egan and
Nollner and determined that the plaintiff could still be shielded by the
protections of Dodd-Frank even though he reported internally, in-
stead of directly to the SEC.67  The court stated that interpreting the
third category of the anti-retaliation provision broadly as an exception
to the general rule would promote the primary purpose of Dodd-
Frank by encouraging whistleblowers to speak out.68
B. Asadi v. GE Energy
The Fifth Circuit in Asadi v. GE Energy,69 concluded that
whistleblowers disclosing under this supposed exception to the gen-
55. Id. at 989-90.
56. Id. at 990.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 993.
60. Nollner, 852 F. Supp. 2d. at 994.
61. Id.
62. No. 3:11CV1424 (SRU), 2012 WL 4444820 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012).
63. Id. at *2.
64. Id. at *2-3.
65. Id.
66. Id. at *3.
67. Id. at *4.
68. Kramer, 2012 WL 4444820, at *4.
69. 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
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eral rule must report to the SEC to be protected by Dodd-Frank, thus
there is no exception at all.70
Asadi brought a lawsuit against GE Energy, alleging that GE En-
ergy fired him after he made an internal complaint about a potential
securities violation.71  Rather, Asadi was initially required to step
down from his current responsibilities and accept a position of lower
responsibility.72  Declining the demotion, Asadi was promptly
terminated.73
Filing a lawsuit, Asadi alleged that GE violated Dodd-Frank’s
whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions.74  On appeal, the court
sought to answer the issue: “whether an individual who is not a
‘whistleblower’ under the statutory definition . . . may, in some cir-
cumstances, nevertheless seek relief under the whistleblower-protec-
tion provision.”75  The court concluded that Dodd-Frank’s protection
only covers whistleblowers reporting directly to the SEC.76  Asadi re-
ported internally, so he was not entitled to protection.77
The Asadi court began its analysis with Dodd-Frank’s definition of a
whistleblower and found initially that the definition expressly indi-
cates a whistleblower must report directly to the SEC, regardless of
the supposed third category exception.78  The court moved on to con-
sider Asadi’s argument that the third category is in direct conflict with
this definition by not mandating reporting to the SEC.79  The court
disagreed with this argument by claiming that the three categories are
not categories of whistleblowers, rather that they are types of actions
that can be taken by a whistleblower who reports directly to the SEC
and receives the protection of Dodd-Frank.80  The majority of district
courts who have ruled on the same issue tend to come to a different
conclusion than the Asadi court.  The extraterritorial issue in Asadi is
dealt with in part IV below.
70. Id. at 623.
71. Id. at 621.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 626.
80. Id.
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C. After Asadi
In the recent case of Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy L.L.C.,81 the Second
Circuit split with the Fifth by holding that the Dodd-Frank
whistleblower protections extend beyond whistleblowers who report
directly to the SEC.82  In this case, Berman was the finance director
for Neo, a media agency.83  During his employment, Berman discov-
ered that Neo was engaged in practices that Berman concluded
amounted to accounting fraud.84  Berman reported this information
within Neo, but never externally to the SEC.85  Berman was subse-
quently fired by a supervisor and filed a lawsuit against the company,
claiming protection under Dodd-Frank.86  The court reached its con-
clusion that the Dodd-Frank provisions should extend beyond those
who report directly to the SEC by reasoning that a rule to the contrary
would severely limit the protections afforded since, among other rea-
sons, some whistleblowers, such as attorneys and accountants, are un-
able to report to the SEC before reporting internally.87  The court’s
view created a circuit split between the Second and Fifth Circuits.
1. Federal District Cases Agreeing with Berman: Majority View
Since Asadi, most cases have disagreed with its holding.  The major-
ity of district courts agree that a whistleblower should not be denied
protection under Dodd-Frank for reporting SOX violations internally,
as opposed to reporting them directly to the SEC.
In Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) L.L.C.,88 the plaintiff,
an employee of defendant, Thomson Reuters, brought a lawsuit
against the defendant for violating the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.89  Thomson Reuters had created a new product that would allow
them to gauge the expectations and attitudes of consumers in regard
to the U.S. economy and how those attitudes might change.90  This
information would aid investors in deciding where and when to invest.
Reuters released this information to its subscribers at a specified time
each day, but Rosenblum learned that certain subscribers were receiv-
ing this information nearly an hour earlier than all other subscribers,
81. 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015).
82. Id. at 153, 155.
83. Id. at 148-49.
84. Id. at 149.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Berman, 801 F.3d at 151.
88. 984 F. Supp. 2d 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
89. Id. at 143.
90. Id.
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giving them an unequal advantage.91  Rosenblum expressed his con-
cerns about the early disclosures to several of his supervisors and, af-
ter being turned away, reported the disclosures to the FBI.92
Rosenblum was fired by Thomson Reuters shortly afterward.93  Ro-
senblum argued that his disclosures should be protected under Dodd-
Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions, whereas Thomson Reuters claimed
this relief was not available to Rosenblum under Asadi because Ro-
senblum did not report directly to the SEC.94  The court held that Ro-
senblum was protected by the anti-retaliation provisions, despite the
decision in Asadi, because he had reported internally and to the FBI.95
In Ellington v. Giacoumakis,96 Ellington was employed as a finan-
cial planner for New England Investment & Retirement Group, Inc.97
Ellington learned that the company was producing investment reports
to clients that were misleading.98  Ellington reported his concerns in-
ternally to his supervisor, Giacoumakis, and wrote a report detailing
his concerns.99
Ellington filed the report with the company’s compliance office, and
Giacoumakis terminated him.100  After being fired, Ellington dis-
closed the report and the company’s misleading information to the
SEC, which began an investigation.101  Ellington also filed a lawsuit
against the company, claiming he was entitled to the Dodd-Frank pro-
tections.102  As in the other cases, the defendant argued that the
Dodd-Frank protections do not cover Ellington because he reported
internally, instead of reporting directly to the SEC.103  The court
agreed with the majority of courts and with Ellington, holding that
Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protections extend to a whistleblower
who reports internally.104  The court reasoned that this interpretation
was more in line with Congress’ intent in promoting whistleblower
activities, as opposed to the view of the court in Asadi.105
91. Id. at 143-44.
92. Id. at 144.
93. Id.
94. Rosenblum, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 146.
95. Id. at 148.
96. 977 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D. Mass. 2013).
97. Id. at 43.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 43-44.
101. Id. at 44.
102. Ellington, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 44.
103. Id. at 45.
104. Id.
105. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\15-2\DPB202.txt unknown Seq: 12  2-JUN-17 10:39
138 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:127
In Connolly v. Remkes,106 the plaintiff, Connolly, worked for a com-
pany involved in securities and owned by the defendant, Remkes.107
During her work, Connolly received a file containing checks from a
different financial advisor in violation of the Financial Industry Regu-
latory Authority (“FINRA”).108  Connolly informed Remkes of her
concerns and Remkes instructed her to contact the company’s compli-
ance department.109  The compliance department affirmed Connolly’s
concerns that this was a violation.110  Upon hearing of this, Remkes
told Connolly she should have presented the situation to the compli-
ance department as a hypothetical.111  The compliance department
then contacted Connolly for a statement on the issue, which Remkes
directed her to ignore and instead drafted his own email regarding the
matter, which Connolly claims was untruthful.112  Refusing to be a
part of this cover-up, Connolly resigned and subsequently informed
the compliance department about the checks.113  Connolly filed suit
against Remkes, claiming she was pressured into resigning and should
receive the protection of Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions.114
The court held that, despite the Asadi decision, the plaintiff should be
entitled to the anti-retaliation provisions even though she did not re-
port directly to the SEC, but reported internally instead.115
Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp.,116 featured Khazin, a fi-
nancial oversight officer of TD Ameritrade, who discovered that one
of Ameritrade’s products was improperly priced in violation of the
federal securities laws.117  Khazin reported this information to his su-
pervisor, who advised Khazin to conduct an impact analysis, which
would project the cost-benefit analysis of fixing the pricing issue.118
Fixing the pricing issue would be costly to Ameritrade and Khazin’s
supervisor told Khazin to take no further action and to stop emailing
her about the situation.119  Khazin’s supervisor later accused Khazin
of being involved in a supposed invoicing issue, even though Khazin
106. No. 5:14-CV-01344-LHK, 2014 WL 5473144 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014).
107. Id. at *1.
108. Id. at *1-2.
109. Id. at *1.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *2.
112. Connolly, 2014 WL 5473144, at *2.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *6.
116. No. 13-4149 (SDW) (MCA), 2014 WL 940703 (D. N.J. Mar. 11, 2014).
117. Id. at *1.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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had little involvement with invoices, and Khazin was fired.120  Khazin
reported the violation to the SEC and argued he was entitled to the
protection of the anti-retaliation provisions.121  The court held that the
anti-retaliation provisions of Dodd-Frank extend beyond the limits
placed on them in Asadi to cover whistleblowers who “report poten-
tial violations to a supervisory authority and not to the SEC itself.”122
In Genberg v. Porter,123 the situation leading up to the lawsuit is
complicated, but can be boiled down to a few pertinent facts.
Genberg was a high-ranking employee for a corporation, where Porter
was the CEO.124  Genberg alerted Porter and the corporation’s board
of directors that they had violated the SEC rules on proxy voting by
“allowing its [Board of Directors] to vote the shares in the custodial
account on a ‘non-routine’ matter without instruction of the beneficial
owners of the shares.”125  Genberg was subsequently terminated.126
Genberg then filed a complaint, claiming he was fired in violation of
the anti-retaliation provisions of Dodd-Frank.127  The defendants ar-
gued that Genberg was not entitled to this protection because he did
not report directly to the SEC.128  Agreeing with the majority of
courts that have decided this issue, the court held that Genberg may
still be considered a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank, and therefore
was entitled to the anti-retaliation protections “even though he has
not provided the SEC with any information regarding alleged federal
securities law violations.”129
Murray v. UBS Securities, L.L.C.,130 involved Murray, a securities
strategist employed by UBS.131  As part of his employment, Murray
would publish reports regarding UBS’s products, which were pub-
lished for UBS’s clients.132  According to Murray, UBS attempted to
pressure Murray into writing misleading reports that would cast
UBS’s products in a more favorable light.133  Murray refused and re-
120. Id.
121. Id. at *1-2.
122. Khazin, 2014 WL 940703, at *6.
123. 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106-07 (D. Colo. 2013) aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part, 566
F. App’x 719 (10th Cir. 2014).
124. Id. at 1097.
125. Id. at 1098.
126. Id. at 1099.
127. Id. at 1104.
128. Id.
129. Genberg, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 1106-07.
130. No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013).
131. Id. at *1.
132. Id.
133. Id. at *1-2.
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ported this information to several of his managers and supervisors.134
UBS later fired Murray.135  Murray filed suit against UBS, claiming he
was unlawfully discharged and deserved protection under the anti-re-
taliation provisions of Dodd-Frank.136  As in the other cases, UBS ar-
gued that because Murray only reported the information internally,
and not to the SEC; he was not entitled to protection as a
whistleblower.137  The court here agreed with the majority view and
disagreed with Asadi by holding that Murray was entitled to the anti-
retaliation protections of Dodd-Frank even though he only reported
the misconduct internally.138
In Yang v. Navigators Group, Inc.139 the plaintiff, Yang, worked as a
risk officer for the defendant, Navigators.140  During her time working
for Navigators, Yang reported to the CFO several instances of fraud
being committed by Navigators employees.141  Yang also notified the
CEO and general counsel for Navigators and was fired shortly after-
ward.142  The Southern District of New York granted the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to demon-
strate that she had actually complained either to the SEC or internally
within the company.143  The majority of the plaintiff’s evidence re-
garding the defendant’s fraud was comprised of outside research gath-
ered by other individuals before the plaintiff had even started working
for the defendant.144  Although the court ruled in favor of the defen-
dant in this case, the court also followed the majority view that a
whistleblower who reports within the organization, as opposed to re-
porting directly to the SEC, may still be protected under Dodd-Frank,
disagreeing with Asadi.145  The court here cites both Genberg and
Nollner in affirming this rule.146
Azim v. Tortoise Capital Advisors, L.L.C.147 features the plaintiff,
Azim, working as a vice president for the defendant, Tortoise.148  Dur-
134. Id. at *2.
135. Id.
136. Murray, 2013 WL 2190084, at *2.
137. Id. at *3.
138. Id. at *7.
139. 155 F. Supp. 3d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), vacated, 2016 WL 7436485, at *1 (2d. Cir. Dec. 22,
2016).
140. Id. at 330.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 332-33, 336-37.
144. Id. at 332-33.
145. Yang, 155 F. Supp. 3d at 336-37.
146. Id.
147. No. 13-2267-KHV, 2014 WL 707235 (D. Kan. Feb. 24, 2014).
148. Id. at *1.
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ing his employment, Azim learned that Tortoise was engaging in
fraudulent misrepresentations made to investors and false filings with
the SEC.149  Azim reported his concerns to the director of human re-
sources of the company and was subsequently fired.150  Azim filed a
lawsuit against the company claiming, among other things, that he was
entitled to the protection of Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliatory provi-
sions.151  The court agreed with Azim’s contention that simply because
he reported his concerns about Tortoise’s fraudulent conduct to his
supervisor, and not to the SEC, he was still entitled to Dodd-Frank’s
protection.152
In Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C.,153 Bussing worked in an inde-
pendent contractor capacity for COR, a private investment com-
pany.154  COR was in the process of acquiring another company at the
time and hired Bussing as the company’s Executive Vice President.155
Shortly after Bussing began working as Executive Vice President of
the acquired company, FINRA began an investigation of the acquired
company for several suspected violations and served the company
with production requests.156  Bussing began complying with these re-
quests and uncovered a number of other violations.157  Bussing re-
ported the violations to several supervisors at COR who told her not
to comply with the requests.158  Bussing continued to reply to the re-
quests, was terminated, and filed suit against the company.159  On the
issue of whether Bussing’s internal reporting entitled her to Dodd-
Frank’s whistleblower protections, the court ruled in the affirma-
tive.160  The court reasoned that the text of the Dodd-Frank Act is
ambiguous on this issue, but the provision can be reconciled with the
Act as a whole, stating:
[w]hen the term “whistleblower” is given its ordinary meaning—for
purposes of the retaliation section only—everything falls into place.
The broad protections of subsection (iii) are given effect, while re-
wards under the bounty program are properly limited to
whistleblowers who provide tips to the SEC. But the same is not
true under the contrary interpretation. When “whistleblower” is
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at *3.
153. 20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb. 2014).
154. Id. at 723.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 724.
158. Id.
159. Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 724-25.
160. Id. at 733.
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used in its narrower sense, subsection (iii) serves no significant pur-
pose, and its aim of broadly protecting whistleblowers is stifled.161
The Bussing court thus agreed with the majority view.
2. Federal District Cases Agreeing with Asadi: Minority View
The minority view that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protections
only extend to those who disclose directly to the SEC, as set forth
in Asadi, has been followed by a small number of federal district
courts.  These courts contend that the Act is not ambiguous; therefore,
it must be strictly construed in accordance with the literal text.
Wagner v. Bank of America Corp.,162 was a case involving Wagner,
an appraiser working for LandSafe Appraisal Services, Inc.163  Wag-
ner overheard one of her coworkers telling another coworker that his
wife was helping him with his appraisals, which is a violation of the
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice.164  Wagner re-
ported her suspicions to several supervisors and was eventually termi-
nated.165  Wagner filed suit against her employer claiming, in part,
protection under the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions.166  The
court determined that Wagner was not a whistleblower entitled to
Dodd-Frank’s protections because she did not report directly to the
SEC, stating:
[i]nitially, and in my view dispositively, the statute defines the term
“whistleblower”: “any individual who provides, or 2 or more indi-
viduals acting jointly who provide, information relating to a violation
of the securities laws to the [Securities Exchange] Commission, in a
manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.” 15
U.S.C. § 78u–6(a)(6) (emphasis added). Ms. Wagner did not pro-
vide any information to the Commission, whether relating to a vio-
lation of the securities laws or otherwise, prior to her termination.
Accordingly, she was not a “whistleblower” as defined in this
statute.167
The Wagner court thus agreed with the court in Asadi.
In Englehart v. Career Education Corp.,168 the defendant, Career
Education, was a corporation involved in running school systems, and
employed the plaintiff, Englehart, as a director of career services.169
161. Id. at 730.
162. No. 12-CV-00381-RBJ, 2013 WL 37866 43 (D. Colo. July 19, 2013).
163. Id. at *1.
164. Id.
165. Id. at *1-4.
166. Id. at *4.
167. Id.
168. No. 8:14-CV-444-T-33EAJ, 2014 WL 2619501 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2014).
169. Id. at *1.
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While she was employed with the defendant, Englehart raised con-
cerns to her supervisors that Career Education was misrepresenting its
enrollment numbers and budget to shareholders.170  The New York
Attorney General’s Office began an investigation into Career Educa-
tion and Englehart was fired thereafter.171  Englehart filed suit against
Career Education, claiming protection as a whistleblower under
Dodd-Frank.172  The court held that the anti-retaliation provision of
Dodd-Frank is not ambiguous and, therefore, the provision offers pro-
tection only to whistleblowers who report directly to the SEC.173  The
court further stated that the mere fact that other courts have extended
Dodd-Frank’s provisions beyond whistleblowers who report to the
SEC does not result in the provision being deemed ambiguous.174
In Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc.,175 the legal dispute
arose between the company Orion Energy and its CEO, Verfuerth.176
The board of Orion Energy voted to remove Verfuerth from his posi-
tion as CEO and, instead, make him an honorary chairman.177  Verfu-
erth then sent the board members an e-mail titled “Whistleblower
Filing,” informing the board that he was filing a whistleblower com-
plaint under Sarbanes-Oxley for alleged securities violations commit-
ted by the company.178  The board fired Verfuerth following the e-
mail.179  Verfuerth then contacted the SEC to notify them of the al-
leged violations.180  Verfuerth also filed a lawsuit against Orion En-
ergy, claiming protection under Dodd-Frank.181  Like the other courts
that agreed with the Asadi court, this court first concluded that the
text of Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliatory provisions are not ambiguous
and noted that none of the courts disagreeing with Asadi have given
specific reasoning as to how the provisions are vague.182  The court
concluded that Verfuerth was not a whistleblower entitled to Dodd-
Frank’s protection because he did not report directly to the SEC
before he was terminated.183
170. Id.
171. Id. at *2.
172. Id.
173. Id. at *7.
174. Englehart, 2014 WL 2619501, at *8.
175. 65 F. Supp. 3d 640 (E.D. Wis. 2014).
176. Id. at 642.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 642-43.
180. Id. at 643.
181. Verfuerth, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 643.
182. Id. at 644-45 (citing Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 626 (5th Cir.
2013)).
183. Id. at 646.
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The court in Puffenbarger v. Engility Corp.,184 also followed the mi-
nority Asadi view that whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank must report
directly to the SEC.185  Engility Corp. hired Puffenbarger as its direc-
tor of payroll.186  Puffenbarger learned that another employee had
been granted a “cash out” in violation of the company’s new policy
and reported her concerns to several supervisors.187  The supervisors
conducted an investigation, concluded that no wrongdoing had oc-
curred, and restructured Engility Corp.’s payroll system.188  Puf-
fenbarger resigned shortly afterward.189  Puffenbarger filed a Dodd-
Frank retaliation suit against Engility Corp.190  The court denied Puf-
fenbarger’s assertions that she was entitled to whistleblower status
under Dodd-Frank.191  The court noted the circuit split between Asadi
and Berman, but it agreed with Asadi that the text of the statute was
unambiguous and, therefore, only whistleblowers who report directly
to the SEC are entitled to protection.192
As the cases demonstrate, whistleblower reporting and awards have
undoubtedly grown and are likely a successful means by Congress to
cut down on securities violations.  However, the outcome of cases
seem to hinge on the interpretation of the statutory language.  Conse-
quently, Asadi’s restriction on internal reporting protection and
Dodd-Frank’s interpretation as per the SEC will likely continue to di-
verge.193  Since the case history seems to show this prevalent oscillat-
ing outcome, the likelihood of the courts reconciling the conflict is
very slim.  Perhaps the Supreme Court will soon be in the position to
resolve the issue once and for all, especially given how frequently re-
taliation claims made by whistleblowers arise in litigation.194  Some
scholars have advocated that should the issue be entertained by the
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court should interpret the anti-retalia-
tion provision in favor of finding that a whistleblower does not need
to report directly to the SEC to be able to bring a subsequent retalia-
184. 151 F. Supp. 3d 651 (E.D. Va. 2015).
185. Id. at 664 (citing Asadi, 720 F.3d at 626).
186. Id. at 654.
187. Id. at 656-57.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 657.
190. Puffenbarger, 151 F. Supp. 3d at 651.
191. Id. at 663.
192. Id. at 663-64.
193. Overall, the district court cases disagreeing with the holding in Asadi find that the statu-
tory provisions are ambiguous, while the post-Asadi cases that agree with Asadi’s holding find
that the anti-retaliation provisions are not ambiguous. Klein, supra note 43, at 296-97.
194. Samuel Gorski, Whistleblower Protection Under Dodd Frank and Sarbanes –Oxley: Inter-
pretative Developments from 2014, 34 BANKING & FIN. L. REV., 478, 489-90 (2014).
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tion claim.195  Therefore, as an exception to the whistleblower defini-
tion, the  Court should examine the third section of the anti-
retaliation provision.196  This interpretation, the argument goes, will
encompass the public policy argument197 because a whistleblower who
reports claims under SOX and concomitantly suffers retaliation may
still file for retaliation under Dodd-Frank even without filing a direct
claim with the SEC.198  Regardless of these outcome in the cases, one
would certainly appreciate the fact that creating an environment for
employees to report internally and also granting employees the option
to go straight to the SEC undoubtedly makes the whistleblower pro-
gram reach its major goal of monitoring the financial system.199
IV. SOX VERSUS DODD-FRANK ACT’S WHISTLEBLOWER
PROVISIONS
The passing of SOX in 2002 as a result of the Enron and WorldCom
scandals was applauded as one of the most “protective anti-retaliation
provision in the world” for whistleblowers.200  However, SOX did not
apparently live up to this expectation given the statistical data of the
first few years after its passing.  Only 3.6% of whistleblower claims
were successful in the first three years while only 6.5% were successful
on appeal.201  This was compounded by the fact that meeting the legal
standards on the merits under SOX was tough, and as such 66.7% of
cases were rejected by the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration with 95.2% of the cases appealed to the administrative law
judges were rejected.202  One scholar espoused the view that SOX
“gives the illusion of protection without truly meaningful opportuni-
ties or remedies for achieving it.”203  Comparing the statutory text of
195. Klein, supra note 43, at 314.
196. Id.
197. Id. This argument contends that the interpretation of Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation pro-
visions invariably allows for using public policy considerations as a guide to statutory interpreta-
tion. Id. at 307-08. So, in considering the public value of Dodd-Frank, which was to deal with
public concerns about the economy in 2008, the courts should lend themselves to such considera-
tions in statutory interpretation as opposed to a strict adherence to the statutory language. Id.
198. Id. at 315.
199. Keen, supra note 2, at 235.
200. Jessica Luhrs, Encouraging Litigation: Why Dodd Frank Goes Too Far in Eliminating the
Procedural Difficulties in Sarbanes Oxley, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 175, 179 (2012) (quoting Rich-
ard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 65 (2007)).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Bradley Mark Nerderman, Should Courts Apply Dodd Frank Prohibition on the Enforce-
ment of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements Retrospectively, 98 IOWA L. REV. 2141, 2152 (citing
Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1764 (2007)).
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SOX with that of Dodd-Frank will be helpful in illuminating some of
the improved provisions as expanded under Dodd-Frank.
Under SOX, the scope of whistleblower protection for employees
under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) deals with whistleblower protection for
employees of publicly-traded companies that report violations, and
provides that:
No company . . . or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor,
or agent of such company . . . may discharge, demote, suspend,
threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an em-
ployee in the terms and conditions of employment because of any
lawful act done by the employee-1) to provide information . . .
which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation
[and] . . . when the information or assistance is provided to or the
investigation is conducted by A) a Federal regulatory or law en-
forcement agency . . . or C) a person with supervisory authority over
the employee.204
This section is replicated under Dodd-Frank § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii),
but, as initially stated in the introduction, under SOX, whistleblower
protection was limited to employees of a company that either regis-
tered a class of securities per § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 or was required to file reports under § 15(d) of the Securities
Act.205  Section 806 of SOX provides for civil and criminal liability on
corporations that take retaliatory actions against whistleblowers as
well as provides for reinstatement or other forms of remedies.206
Section 301 provided that a mechanism be in place for receiving and
retaining  employees concerns and reporting of financial improprieties
in order to catch corporate fraud.207  Over time, the practical imple-
mentation of these provisions proved ineffective.208  Employees were
not only subject to a high burden of proof but were also faced with a
time crunch, within a ninety day period, in filing a successful claim.209
To make matters worse, the provisions of SOX were subjected to va-
rying interpretation by the courts resulting in different and arbitrary
results.210  Consequently, the whistleblower provisions did not live up
to its expectations.211 These loopholes were apparently rectified under
204. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2012). Unlike SOX, Dodd-Frank deals with public companies and
subsidiaries or affiliates whose financial information is included in their financial statements.
205. King, supra note 1, at 1463.
206. 18 U.S.C. § 1415A(a).
207. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301.
208. Umang Desai, Crying Fowl: Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 43
LOY. U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 443-44 (2012).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 444.
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Dodd-Frank.  Under § 922, for example, the definition of a
whistleblower was changed by including four specific elements,212
thereby unequivocally defining individuals who are permitted to bring
a whistleblower claim.  An individual must “voluntarily furnish origi-
nal information resulting in a successful enforcement action”; the in-
formation has to be provided voluntarily, that is, free from pressure;
the “original information” has to come from “the individual’s inde-
pendent knowledge or analysis”;213 and the information provided
must result in successful enforcement or other form of punishment.214
A pertinent and notable feature of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower
provision of § 922 is the bounty program, which both provides incen-
tives and awareness which tends to enable the reduction of corporate
fraud.215  The incentive of awarding the successful whistleblower be-
tween 10% to 30% of a recovery of $100,000216 is a huge incentive. In
the same vein, a whistleblower who is retaliated upon by the employer
terminating employment after reporting a violation could get rein-
statement, reward, or double pay for missed days under Dodd-
Frank.217  Another positive addition in Dodd-Frank is that an individ-
ual who is potentially liable for fraud can present himself or herself as
an anonymous whistleblower.218  The statute of limitations under SOX
to report a claim is 180 days from the violation, or the knowledge of
it.219  In contrast, under Dodd-Frank, an action may be brought not
more than six years after the date on which the violation occurred,
although not more than three years from when the whistleblower be-
came aware of the facts.220   These changes seem to have a positive
effect as it resulted in a spike in whistleblower inquiries or tips.  In
2015, the SEC indicated it had directly received over 4,000
whistleblower tips under Dodd-Frank, a thirty percent increase from
2014.221  However, companies with in-house internal reporting mecha-
212. Id. at 448.
213. Id. at 449 (For what is meant by Original information, see Rule 21 F-4, but this is derived
from a person’s independent knowledge and not from publicly available sources.)
214. Desai, supra note 208, at 449-50.
215. Id. at 450-51.
216. Id. at 451.
217. Id. Such an employee may also be reimbursed for attorney’s fees. Id. In addition to the
recovery of actual pay, Dodd Frank improved the whistleblower’s position by providing for re-
covery of double back pay. Id.
218. Id. at 452.
219. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806(b)(2)(D), 18 U.S.C § 514(A)(b)(2)(D) (2012).
220. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 922 (h)(1)(B)(iii), 15
U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii) (2012).
221. NICK BEERMAN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING SOX WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS: LEAD-
ING LAWYERS ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS AND RECOGNIZING/PREVENTING CONDUCT
THAT LEADS TO CLAIMS 9 (2016).
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nisms and credibility with their employees are better placed than to
the SEC to have their employees approach them with their com-
plaints.222  On the whole, Dodd-Frank tends to improve corporate
governance, as the whistleblower provisions serve as mandatory ex-
amination of federal compliance.223  Whether indeed corporate com-
pliance is promoted is another debate, but what seems obvious is that
the bounty program under Dodd-Frank unequivocally allows corpo-
rate employees with knowledge of a violation to “become statutorily
defined as whistleblowers” when they do report such violations to the
SEC and qualify for the “bounty” as provided by the SEC.224  How-
ever, the pending issue to resolve, as indicated by the case history, is
the one of the interpretations of the statutory anti-retaliatory provi-
sion between company employees who report directly to the SEC and
apparently meet the statutory requirement versus those who report
internally and apparently do or do not meet the requirement.  In other
words, the anti-retaliatory protection depends on the authority to
which the employee reported the wrongdoing.225
The added question that goes beyond that the boundaries of the
United States, is the looming question, also posed in Asadi, whether
under Dodd-Frank, the anti-retaliation protection for SEC whistle-
blowers should apply to employees outside the United States.  In
other words, would company employees working for a U.S. company
abroad who finds a violation be protected under the anti-retaliation
provisions?
V. DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS AND THEIR
IMPACT ON COMPANY EMPLOYEES OUTSIDE
THE UNITED STATES
As discussed above, Dodd-Frank broadened the definition of who
may be a covered whistleblower under SOX.  However, both under
SOX and Dodd-Frank, the courts, in addressing the issue of extraterri-
torial application of the provision, hold that it does not apply to com-
pany employees extraterritorially.226  In Asadi, the plaintiff filed a
complaint against GE Energy, claiming that GE violated Dodd-
Frank’s whistleblower-protection provision by firing him after he
made reports of violations on the part of GE.227  At the trial court,
222. Id.
223. Desai, supra note 208, at 463.
224. Sprinzen, supra note 11, at 153.
225. Id. at 169.
226. BEERMAN ET AL., supra note 221, at 3.
227. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C , 720 F.3d 620, 621 (5th Cir. 2013).
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GE defended, in part, that the whistleblower provision does not apply
to extraterritorial situations.228  The district court dismissed Asadi’s
complaint, holding that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions do not
cover extraterritorial whistleblowing.229  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
did not address Asadi’s extraterritorial claim, but instead focused
solely on whether Asadi was a whistleblower.230  While the appellate
court did not address the extraterritoriality issue, it did affirm the trial
court’s decision.231
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd.,232 National Australia
Bank (“National”), a foreign company, purchased a Florida-based
company, HomeSide Lending.233  National wrote down the value of
HomeSide’s assets, resulting in National’s stock falling.234  A group of
National stockholders brought suit, alleging violations of § 10b-5 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.235  The Supreme Court first held
that § 10b-5 does not apply extraterritorially.236  The Court reached
this conclusion by stating that unless there existed an explicit, contrary
intent by Congress for a particular piece of legislation to extend extra-
territorially, the legislation should be presumed to apply only domesti-
cally.237  The Court then held that, even though the Exchange Act
explicitly states that it applies to interstate commerce and the Act’s
definition of interstate commerce includes foreign commerce, this is
not determinative in deciding whether the Exchange Act applies ex-
traterritorially.238  The Court next deems the Act’s purpose section,
which describes the impact of the U.S. stock exchanges on the foreign
markets, as also not sufficient to overcome the presumption of domes-
tic application.239  Finally, the Court points to § 30(b) of the Exchange
Act, which states that the Act does not apply to individuals transact-
ing business outside the jurisdiction of the United States.240  The
Court concluded that the Exchange Act did not apply extraterritori-
ally and thus, the plaintiffs’ claims must fail.241  Later, Meng-Lin, in
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 623.
231. Id. at 630.
232. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
233. Id. at 251.
234. Id. at 252.
235. Id. at 252-53.
236. Id. at 265.
237. Id. at 255.
238. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 263.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 263-64.
241. Id. at 265.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\15-2\DPB202.txt unknown Seq: 24  2-JUN-17 10:39
150 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:127
the Second Circuit case, would rely on Morrison to conclude that the
anti-retaliation provisions of Dodd-Frank do not apply extraterritori-
ally since the presumption against extraterritorial application could
not be overcome by any explicit provision to the contrary in Dodd-
Frank.242
In the 2014 case of Meng-Lin, the issue was whether the
whistleblower anti-retaliation provision applied to a “foreign worker
employed abroad by a foreign corporation where all events related to
the disclosures occurred abroad.”243  The Second Circuit held that
Dodd-Frank does not apply outside the United States, and, therefore,
the plaintiff, a citizen and resident of Taiwan working for a Chinese
company, Siemens China Ltd., that had shares listed on the New York
Stock Exchange, was not eligible for protection under Dodd-Frank.244
The Second Circuit also stated that the employee did not state a claim
requiring the application of domestic anti-retaliation provision per the
Dodd-Frank Act.245
Likewise, in the case of Villanueva v. U.S. Department of Labor,246
where a CEO of a subsidiary of Core Laboratories NV, a Dutch Com-
pany publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange, reported that
Core Laboratories had undertaken some questionable pricing ar-
rangement.247  Under the nefarious arrangement, Core Laboratories
ended up with a ten-percent contractual revenue even though the
company did not really procure the sales contracts from which this
revenue was generated.248  The CEO further alleged that the company
Saybolt Columbia underreported taxable revenue to the government
of Colombia as well as unlawfully claimed Value Added Tax exemp-
tion to the supposed revenue.249  The complainant did not agree to
sign the company’s tax return and was later dismissed.250  The com-
plainant’s SOX complaint was initially dismissed by the OSHA, and
the dismissal was affirmed by an Administrative Law Judge; the De-
partment of Labor Review Board and the Fifth Circuit also affirmed
the dismissal on the basis that SOX has no obvious extraterritorial
application.251
242. Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175, 183 (2d Cir. 2014).
243. Id. at 176-77.
244. Keen, supra note 2, at 224.
245. Meng-Lin, 763 F.3d at 177.
246. 743 F.3d 103 (5th Cir. 2014).
247. Id. at 106.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 107.
251. Id. at 110.
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Thus, as it stands now, the broad definition of a covered
whistleblower under Dodd-Frank is not applicable when it comes to
extraterritorial application as confirmed by the cases discussed above.
However, the failure of SOX and Dodd-Frank to extend outside of
the United States does not necessarily mean employers of foreign-
based subsidiaries should not be concerned about foreign-based
whistleblower claims, especially given that other countries have their
own statutes under which liability may ensue.252  As a result, to be on
the safe side, a U.S. parent company with a foreign subsidiary com-
pany may nonetheless wish to avoid or discourage fraud through the
use of codes of conduct or codes of ethics.  For example, U.S. employ-
ers should encourage its foreign employees to report possible corpo-
rate violations, even though the subsidiary may not be directly subject
to Dodd-Frank.  In so doing, the U.S. company should, however, be-
ware of possibly of running afoul of the privacy laws of other countries
or even their cultural norms.253
VI. DODD-FRANK, EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS, AND MANDATORY
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) favors and recognizes arbitra-
tion agreements as well as the courts’ ability to enforce such agree-
ments, and this includes arbitration agreements in securities
disputes.254  Consequently, the FAA seeks to enforce arbitration
agreements in securities disputes, like any other contract, so long as
the arbitration agreement is valid.255  Under Dodd-Frank, Congress
established a new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (“the
CFPB”).256  It was established as an independent branch of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board.257  In encouraging even more enforcement of ar-
bitration clauses, the CFPB and the SEC were empowered to
regulate, and in fact even ban, impose, or limit the use of arbitration
clauses in consumer finances and investment contracts.258  Although
these regulatory bodies have been granted this authority to regulate
252. BEERMAN ET AL., supra note 221, at 3.
253. Daniel P. Westman, The Significance of the Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Provisions, 21
LABOR LAW. 141, 152 (2005).
254. Catherine Moore, The Effect of the Dodd- Frank Act on Arbitration Agreements: A Pro-
posal for Consumer Choice, 12 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 503, 506 (2012).
255. Id. at 506-07.
256. Alan Kaplinsky et al., Arbitration Developments: Has the Supreme Court Finally Stepped
In? –  Survey of Consumer Financial Services Law, 66 BUS. LAW. 529, 537 (2011).
257. Id.
258. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 921, 1028, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o, 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2012).
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accordingly regarding arbitration agreements, they have not yet exer-
cised this regulatory power per se.  However, the CFPB has not been
shy in taking a stance – by imposing a ban – when it comes to arbitra-
tion agreements in mortgage contracts, as well as in those pertaining
to whistleblower protections per Dodd-Frank.259  Part of the mandate
from Congress to the CFPB was that it carry out a study, ultimately
resulting in a report, on the use of arbitration on future disputes cov-
ering persons and consumers in relation to consumer products or fi-
nancial services.260  In the same vein, the CFPB was empowered to
prohibit, limit, or impose conditions for arbitration agreements as
deemed necessary to protect public interest.261  Two reports on pre-
dispute arbitration clauses have been submitted by the CFPB since
then: one in 2013 and the second in 2015.262  Contrary to the intent of
arbitration clauses, the CFPB Study, released in March of 2015, stated
that a large number of consumers are unaware that their financial
products and services contracts require resolution of disputes through
arbitration or through litigation.263  Even in those cases where con-
sumers are aware of arbitration clauses, very few consumers, fewer
than seven percent, actually understand what arbitration means or
entails.264
259. Michael S. Barr, Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Finance and Investor Contracts, 11
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 793, 799 (2015).
260. Edna Sussman, The Dodd Frank Act: Seeking Fairness and Public Interest in Consumer
Transactions, 18 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 14, 15 (2011).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 16.
263. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB Considers Proposal to Ban Arbitration
Clauses that Allow Companies to Avoid Accountability to their Customers, (Oct. 7, 2015), http://
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-considers-proposal-to-ban-arbitration-
clauses-that-allow-companies-to-avoid-accountability-to-their-customers.
264. Id. At a hearing in on October 7, 2015, the CFPB announced that it is “considering
proposing rules that would ban consumer financial companies from using ‘free pass’ arbitration
clauses to block consumers from suing in groups to obtain relief.” Id. The CFPB also published
an outline of proposals which includes:  “(i) prohibiting pre-dispute arbitration clauses from
foreclosing class litigation; and (ii) requiring submission of any arbitral claims and awards to the
CFPB for collection and possible publication.” The Future of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration
Clauses, JONES DAY 1 (Nov. 2015), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/141bd3d6-06e5-
487e-8fd4-fe8c6ee585a3/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2bb9bb69-4425-4d7a-9ff5-6de73e
0517cc/Future%20of%20Man (citing CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, SMALL BUSINESS
ADVISORY REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING ON ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS:
OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS UNDER CONSIDERATION AND ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED 1-21 (Oct.
7, 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201510_cfpb_small-business-review-panel-packet-ex-
plaining-the-proposal-under-consideration.pdf [hereinafter CFPB PROPOSAL OUTLINE]). Con-
trary to popular thinking, however, currently, the “Bureau is not considering at this time a
proposal that would prohibit entirely the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements.” Id. (quot-
ing CFPB PROPOSAL OUTLINE, supra, at 14).
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A. The Impetus for Reform
Dodd-Frank ushers a shift from the many years of federal policy
favoring arbitration of securities disputes, as under these provisions,
the validity of mandatory arbitration agreements are being chal-
lenged, especially in the context of home loans, mortgage agreements,
and securities fraud.265  This reform is a necessity, especially given that
the bargaining power of the “main stream consumer” against a sophis-
ticated Wall Street firm is parallel.  In fact, most of these arbitration
agreements are given to the consumer on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,
often referred to as contracts of adhesion.  This problem of mandatory
arbitration clauses is compounded by the fact that the growing num-
bers of investors subjected to these mandatory arbitration clauses
were typically forced to FINRA arbitration as it may pertain to their
security investments.266  FINRA favoring mandatory arbitration is
worsened by the fact that one individual of the three-member arbitra-
tion panels is from the security industry, and is thus bias.267  FINRA
membership is made up of the broker-dealers, which creates an obvi-
ous conflict that impliedly shows that FINRA is really not going to
bite the hand that feeds it.268  Prior to the enactment of Dodd Frank,
in 2009, the Arbitration Fairness Act (“AFA”) was introduced but
failed to pass, and Dodd-Frank was used to cover some of the loop-
holes in AFA and, in particular, dispute resolution methods in the in-
dustry.269  In fact, the AFA, although not identical to Dodd-Frank
provisions, has been said to be an “ideological precursor” to the
Dodd-Frank arbitration provisions.270
B. Dodd-Frank and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements
On a daily basis, most people in the United States have knowingly,
or unknowingly, agreed to a boilerplate mandatory arbitration clause
in a contract or agreement.  “Over the years big business has begun
inserting these mandatory arbitration provisions in just about every
265. Moore, supra note 265, at 505.
266. Id. at 510-11.
267. Id.
268. See STARR AUSTEN & MILLER, LLP, Will the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act Make
FINRA Arbitration Obsolete?, STARR AUSTEN (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.starrausten.com/will-
the-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-act-make-finra-arbitration-obsolete; see also Moore, supra
note 265, at 512.
269. Moore, supra note 265, at 511.
270. Id. at 512. The AFA stated a number of findings explaining why the Dodd-Frank was a
better amended to the failed AFA. Id. For example, AFA demonstrated that the Federal Arbi-
tration Act (FAA) was intended to apply to disputes involving sophisticated parties with the
same bargaining power, yet this was not the decision by the AFA. Id.
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contract they can think of.”271  These arbitration provisions tend to
provide businesses the upper hand over consumers in dispute resolu-
tion.272  What may also make these mandatory arbitration agreements
unappealing to the consumer is that “consumers cannot negotiate
these provisions,” but the agreements are offered on a “take it or
leave it” basis.273  Dodd-Frank invokes federal arbitration law in many
ways, but this Article focuses primarily on those provisions that relate
to arbitration and whistleblowers.
“[S]ection 748 amends the Commodity Exchange Act . . . [provid-
ing]: ‘[t]he rights and remedies provided for in this section may not be
waived by any agreement, policy form, or condition of employment
including by a predispute arbitration agreement.’”274  Thus, § 748n (1)
of Dodd-Frank states: “No predispute arbitration agreement shall be
valid or enforceable if the agreement requires arbitration of a dispute
arising under this section.”275 Further, “[s]ection 921 amends . . . sec-
tion 15 of the Securities Act of 1934 . . . [granting the SEC the author-
ity] to prohibit or limit the use of arbitration agreements used by . . .
securities traders.”276
Section 922 amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to signifi-
cantly improve the SEC’s whistleblower program, including provisions
to increase the possible reward to whistleblowers to between 10% and
30% of collected sanctions, which exceeds $1,000,000 by actions re-
sulting from original information by the whistleblower.277  At the time
of reporting a violation, the whistleblower under this section does not
have to identify himself.278  Section 922 clearly states in its anti-arbi-
tration provision that “no predispute arbitration agreement shall be
valid or enforceable, if the agreement requires arbitration of a dispute
arising under this [S]ection.”279  A major issue, and the most heavily
debated one,280 arising after the passage of Dodd Frank in relation to
Section 922 was the question of whether this section should apply ret-
roactively to pending cases prior to the passing of Dodd Frank.  In
Pezza v. Investors Capital Corp.,281 the United States District Court of
Massachusetts,  applying the precedent listed by the Supreme Court in
271. STARR AUSTEN & MILLER, LLP, supra note 279.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Moore, supra note 265, at 517 n.83.
275. Id. (quoting Dodd-Frank Act).
276. Id. at 515.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 516.
279. Id. at 517 n.83 (quoting Dodd-Frank Act).
280. King, supra note 1, at 1463.
281. 767 F. Supp. 2d 225 (D. Mass. 2011).
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Landgraf v. USI Film Products,282 concluded that the prohibition of
pre-arbitration dispute agreement per § 922 applied retrospectively.283
The court held this, even though § 4 of Dodd Frank states that “except
as otherwise specifically provided in this Act . . . or the amendments
made by this Act, this Act and such amendments shall take effect
[one] day after the date of enactment of this Act.”284  On the other
hand, the District Court of Nevada, even though it applied the same
framework as the court in Landgraf, held that § 922 does not apply
retrospectively.285
Section 1028 empowers the CFPB to carry out a study on predis-
pute arbitration agreements in consumer financial products.286  In the
CFPB’s recent report, the CFPB published an outline of proposals,
which includes:  “(i) prohibiting pre-dispute arbitration clauses from
foreclosing class litigation; and (ii) requiring submission of any arbi-
tral claims and awards to the CFPB for collection and possible publi-
cation (‘CFPB Proposal Outline’).”287  Contrary to popular thinking,
however, the “Bureau is not considering at this time a proposal that
would prohibit entirely the use of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements.”288
“Section 1414 amends section 129C of the Truth in Lending Act by”
incorporating sections dealing with arbitration “claims in residential
mortgage loans or consumer credit.”289  Under this section, the right
of the consumer or creditor to agree to arbitration after a claim is
underway is not limited.290
It is therefore apparent that mandatory predispute arbitration
agreements are not favored nor even welcomed; consequently, for
consumer choice to prevail and be fostered, mandatory arbitration
agreements should be obliterated in favor of consumer choice.291  No
doubt the CFPB’s Proposal Outline permits pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in contracts for consumer financial products and services only
under two circumstances: “Arbitration could not block class actions
282. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
283. Pezza, 767 F. Supp. 2d at 233-34.
284. Nerderman, supra note 203, at 2165 (quoting Dodd-Frank Act).
285. Id. at 2143.
286. See JONES DAY, supra note 275, at 1.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Moore, supra note 265, at 517; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act § 1414, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e) (2012).
290. Id. at 518.
291. Id. at 523-24.
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without court action . . . [and] [c]ompanies would be required to sub-
mit arbitration claims filed and awards issued to the CFPB.”292
VII. CONCLUSION
Given that prior to Dodd-Frank, whistleblower provisions were in-
tended to foster and encourage employees to self-report to its em-
ployee, thereby giving the corporations the opportunity to resolve
problems internally.293  This internal resolution process is thwarted
under Dodd-Frank § 922 because it gives the whistleblower incentive
to report to the SEC, and the potential of being rewarded handsomely
undermines the internal dispute resolution mechanism.294  For one
thing, even if a company wanted to investigate and resolve a violation,
that ability is undermined given that the SEC is likely to be notified
first before the company, as in the cases discussed above; the corpora-
tion will then be in a position “to play catch up and could be in the
position of having to defend itself prior to fully investigating the accu-
sations.”295  Consequently, Dodd-Frank, and in particular, § 922 with
its other related sections, marks “a new era of SEC enforcement and
power” without an opportunity for corporations to initially investigate
and attempt to resolve violations296 thereby causing a conundrum for
corporations.  However, the positives of Dodd-Frank over SOX can-
not be underestimated.  These positives under Dodd-Frank include,
for example:  the number of employees covered by federal
whistleblower provisions is far more extensive; the statute of limita-
tions for retaliation claims is extended; significantly increased the
damages available to whistleblowers; and, more importantly, extended
the number of companies protected by whistleblower laws.297  With an
overwhelming increase in the number of tips every year,298 it is quin-
tessential that whistleblowers be protected from retaliation.  This new
legal landscape of whistleblower protection is one that should be em-
braced by both the employer and employees, as this is here to stay, at
least for the time being.
292. JONES DAY, supra note 275, at 1.
293. Moore, supra note 265, at 519-20.
294. Id. at 520.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Nerderman, supra note 203, at 2156.
298. Id. From 2012 to 2014 the SEC received more than 20 percent increase in whistleblower
tips and also issued more awards in 2014 than had been in the combined previous years. Id.;
BEERMAN ET AL., supra note 221, at 9; Michael M. Krauss et al., For Whom the Whistle Blows:
The Role of Private Enforcement in Dodd-Frank’s Regulatory Framework, 8 U. ST. THOMAS J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 194, 204-05 (2014).
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Arbitration as a means of resolving disputes should be a choice for
consumers.  Dodd-Frank does not reject arbitration as a means of
resolving dispute per se, rather, under § 921, it seeks to limit
mandatory arbitration.299  With mandatory arbitration, the consumer
has virtually no choice and as indicated by the 2015 CFPB report.  The
consumer is often not even aware that the agreement entered into is
to require arbitration.  Besides, although arbitration does have its own
shortcomings, giving the consumer the option to choose between liti-
gation and arbitration encompasses the policy of freedom of contract.
In fact, it is more likely the consumer will lean towards arbitration,
especially given the cost of litigation and the potential protracted
court proceedings.300  One of the flaws of SOX, as stated by some
scholars, is that public companies under the SOX whistleblower pro-
tections were able to hide corporate violations from the public by en-
tering into arbitration agreements that are generally private.301
Section 922 of Dodd-Frank, which prohibits predispute arbitration
agreements, has been applauded on the basis that the prohibition
would likely result in civil actions in court that will expose the viola-
tion claims to the public and this exposure will in turn also invariably
lead to investor knowledge of the fraud.  Further, such investor
knowledge will lead to better financial information, and ultimately
greater protections.302  However, denying predispute agreements not
only impedes on the employee’s freedom of contract, but it also de-
prives the employee of the opportunity to resolve problem inexpen-
sively should the employer not want to arbitrate.  By the same token,
some critics believe that with mandatory arbitration of employment
disputes, both employer and employee tend to benefit, especially
given that the employee is faced with increasing litigation costs against
an employer with no cash limit.303
Although there has been a split in the court cases as to whether the
predispute arbitration agreements under Dodd-Frank should apply
retrospectively, when one looks at the intent of Congress behind
Dodd-Frank and the decision of the Supreme Court in Landgraf and
299. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 921, 15 USC
§§ 78o, 80b-5(f) (2012).
300. Some advantages of arbitration include the speed at which the case may be decided,
which usually means lower costs and the ability of the parties to select experts who are special-
ized in the kind of dispute in question. Although arbitration is said to be cheaper and faster,
critics of arbitration believe that arbitration as mandated by the employer provides a biased
forum in favor of the employer. See generally Nerderman, supra note 203, at 2148.
301. Id. at 2157.
302. Id.
303. King, supra note 1, at 1478.
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as “modified and clarified” in the more recent cases of Hughes and
Lindh,304 it becomes apparent that § 922 was not intended to apply
retrospectively to whistleblower claims prior to 2010.305
304. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 951 (1997); Lindh v.
Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 341 (1997).
305. Nerderman, supra note 203, at 2172.
